Hírolvasó

Az utóbbi hetekben több súlyos kibertámadás érte a lengyel egészségügyi szektort. A felhőalapú, Qbusoft által fejlesztett Medyc elektronikus orvosi platform egy SQL-injekciós sérülékenység miatt vált kompromittálttá. Az augusztusi támadás során páciensek személyes adatait (nevek, lakcímek, azonosítók) és nagy valószínűséggel érzékeny egészségügyi dokumentumokat, például kezelési zárójelentéseket is megszerezték. A támadók egy titkosított adatbázis-archívumot szivárogtattak ki, melynek […]

Újra aktívan kihasználja a ShinyHunters kiberbűnözői csoport a CVE-2026-35273 azonosítójú, Oracle PeopleSoft rendszereket érintő sérülékenységet. A hibát az Oracle június 10-én javította, miután a Mandiant korábban jelezte, hogy a támadók május 27. és június 9. között, zero-dayként használták ki, elsősorban felsőoktatási intézmények ellen. A mostani kampányban azonban a támadók már olyan szervezeteket is célba vehettek, […]

Az Apple biztonsági frissítést adott ki az iOS, iPadOS és macOS rendszerek régebbi verzióit érintő sebezhetősége miatt, amelyet a cég elmondása szerint célzott támadások során is kihasználhattak. A CVE-2026-86950 azonosítójú sebezhetőség a CoreGraphics összetevőt érintő out-of-bounds memóriaírási hiba, ami tetszőleges kódfuttatást tesz lehetővé. Az Apple a határellenőrzés (bounds checking) fejlesztésével oldotta meg a problémát. A […]

Az OpenAI még a hónap elején mutatta be az Astrát, mint eddigi legerősebb modelljét. A cég a következő hónapban tervezte az újabb modell kiadását, azonban biztonsági aggályok miatt úgy döntöttek, egyelőre elmarad a megjelenés. A The Wall Street Journail (WSJ) szerint az Astra 6.1 névre keresztelt modell kiadása a következő hónapra volt tervezve, viszont a […]

Az OpenAI megerősítette azt az új biztonsági incidenst, amely során a mesterséges intelligencia (MI) ágensei felhasználók által megadott képeket töltöttek fel külső képtároló szolgáltatókhoz. A vállalat tájékoztatása szerint eddig 53 ilyen esetet azonosítottak annak az átfogó vizsgálatnak a részeként, amelyet az ágensek nem kívánatos viselkedésével kapcsolatban indítottak még a Hugging Face-t érintő biztonság incidens következtében. […]

Overview

Authlib (versions up to and including 1.7.2) contain a signature‑verification bypass in the JSON Web Signature (JWS) general JSON serialization handling. The JsonWebSignature.deserialize_json() function accepts a JWS object with an empty "signatures" array and treats the payload as successfully verified, allowing attackers to supply arbitrary forged content without possessing any key material.

Description

Authlib is a Python library that provides tools for implementing OAuth, OpenID Connect, JWT/JWS/JWE (JSON Web Token / JSON Web Signature / JSON Web Encryption), and other modern authentication and authorization standards. It’s widely used in web applications and microservices to handle token creation, cryptographic validation, and secure communication.

As discussed in CVE-2026-96760, a security flaw in Authlib’s handling of JSON Web Signatures (JWS) makes it possible for an attacker to skip signature verification completely. Normally, a JWS should include at least one valid signature to prove the data hasn’t been tampered with. However, Authlib’s deserialize_json() function mistakenly accepts JWS objects even when the "signatures" section is an empty list. Because the function starts by assuming the signatures are valid and never performs any checks when the list is empty, it ends up treating unsigned data as if it were properly signed. This means an attacker could provide a JWS with no signatures, and Authlib would still treat it as trusted. Both ways of loading a JWS in Authlib are affected:

jws.deserialize_json({"payload":"...", "signatures":[]}, key=None)
jws.deserialize('{"payload":"...","signatures":[]}', key=None)

Impact

An attacker can forge arbitrary authenticated payloads without any signing key or credentials. Systems that rely on Authlib’s JWS verification for authentication, authorization, inter-service message integrity, or signed configuration data may accept attacker‑supplied content as legitimate. Potential attack scenarios inlcude the following:
* Authentication bypass: forged identity or privilege‑escalation claims (e.g., sub=admin).
* Signed message injection between microservices using JWS.
* Forged authorization claims such as scopes, roles, or permissions.
* Integrity bypass in systems relying on signed JWS data.

Solution

The vendor could not be reached to coordinate this vulnerability and an official patch has not been made available at the time of this writing. Users are advised to monitor the project's GitHub repository for updates and install the latest version of this library once a fix has been released.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Tong Hoang Gia (uziii2208) and Nguyen Minh Tuan (nguyenminhtuan28) for reporting this vulnerability. This document was written by Bob Kemerer.

A lengyel CERT Polska egy kiterjedt, Android-eszközöket érintő toll fraud (prémiumszolgáltatásokkal visszaélő) támadássorozatot azonosított és zavart meg, amely fizetett Meta-hirdetésekkel irányította a lengyel felhasználókat kártékony alkalmazások letöltésére a Google Play Áruházból. A vizsgálat során 1235 Meta-hirdetést dokumentáltak, amelyek közül 852 összesen 17, a támadássorozathoz köthető alkalmazást népszerűsített. Hat alkalmazásban bizonyítottan jelen voltak a prémiumszolgáltatásokkal való […]

Overview

Three cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities identified in Readwise Reader for Android version 8.7.2 are disclosed. An attacker with the ability to craft malicious documents or metadata can exploit these vulnerabilities by supplying poisoned content that bypasses sanitization. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the application's WebView context and compromise the confidentiality and integrity of user data, including access to stored documents, credentials, and session tokens.

Description

Readwise Reader from Readwise is designed to provide a unified read-it-later service that helps individuals collect and organize articles, newsletters, videos, and other content of interest into a single reading interface. It is available on multiple platforms including Android and can synchronize content across devices.

CVE-2026-18311: A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the header rendering component in Readwise Reader for Android version 8.7.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript via crafted document metadata fields. The header rendering component is impacted due to insufficient HTML escaping of metadata fields such as 'doc.author' and 'doc.title', which allows malicious scripts to be stored in the user's library and synchronized to Android devices where they are executed in the WebView context.

CVE-2026-18312: A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the WebView URL construction logic in Readwise Reader for Android version 8.7.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript via malicious URL metadata. The WebView URL construction for X (formerly Twitter) video fallback and iOS paywall messages is impacted due to improper escaping of URL metadata before interpolation into href attributes, which allows user-controlled values to break out of the URL structure and inject script elements that are inserted into the DOM via innerHTML.

CVE-2026-18320: A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the article body sanitization component in Readwise Reader for Android version 8.7.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript via malicious SVG markup. The sanitize-html configuration is impacted due to a wildcard attribute rule that permits all attributes on SVG and PATH elements, which allows script-capable attributes such as onload and onerror to bypass sanitization.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to create or modify documents accessible to Readwise Reader can supply documents containing malicious metadata or markup that bypasses sanitization and is subsequently stored in users libraries. Because these documents are synchronized to Android devices and rendered within the Reader WebView, each vulnerability enables stored XSS: CVE-2026-18311 and CVE-2026-18312 through poisoned metadata, and CVE-2026-18320 through malicious SVG markup.

Solution

Unfortunately, the vendor could not be reached to coordinate this issue. Users should apply vendor updates as they become available (check Vendor Information section for updates) and keep Readwise Reader updated through the Google Play Store. As of publication, version 8.10.1 includes a patch that addresses the sanitizer-wildcard issue. Additionally, users should exercise caution when adding content from untrusted sources to their reading library and consider manually reviewing document metadata before saving articles to minimize exposure to malicious content.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Zampier Zago (FUNFACTOR1) for reporting these vulnerabilities. This document was written by Alex Lewis.

Az OpenAI egyik mesterséges intelligencia ügynöke júniusban jogosulatlanul hozzáfért egy ausztrál kormányzati egészségügyi weboldal nem nyilvános fájljaihoz.

A hét egyik fő kockázatát az internet felől elérhető rendszerek sérülékenységei jelentik: a WordPress egyik frissen javított hibáját órákon belül támadni kezdték, miközben egy májusban javított Roundcube-hiba aktív kihasználását is megerősítették. Emellett az AI egyre nagyobb szerepet kap a támadások automatizálásában, az ukrajnai események pedig ismét megmutatták a fizikai és a digitális infrastruktúra szoros összefonódását.

A NIST közzétette az operatív technológia (OT) biztonságáról szóló Special Publication 800-82 Revision 4 c. útmutatójának frissített tervezetét. A dokumentum nyilvános véleményezése 2026. november 30-ig tart. Az útmutató bemutatja, hogyan biztosítható az OT-rendszerek védelme a teljesítményre, megbízhatóságra és üzembiztonságra vonatkozó sajátos követelmények figyelembevételével. A felülvizsgált változat kibővíti az érintett ágazatok körét, többek között az épületautomatizálással, […]

Overview

ViewSonic vCast software, which is included in ViewBoard smartboard devices, contains multiple vulnerabilities that an attacker can chained to achieve full device compromise.

Description

ViewSonic ViewBoards are widely used smart display devices (smartboard), typically deoloyed in enterprise and educational environments. vCast is ViewSonic’s proprietary software suite for wireless connection between smartboards, which are Android-based systems, and devices running a client application. Three distinct vulnerabilities, all invoking unauthenticated endpoints, have been identified within the vCast suite.

CVE-2026-82989
vCast’s media streaming service allows a remote attacker to exfiltrate JPEG images of screen content via GET requests to an unauthenticated /snapshot or /screen API endpoint.

CVE-2026-82988
vCast’s Android Package Kit (APK) delivery mechanism allows a remote attacker to trigger unprivileged file installation by providing a malicious APK URL through an unauthenticated download endpoint.

CVE-2026-82987
vCast’s network services allow a remote attacker to inject arbitrary input into service endpoints via HTTP requests to exposed unauthenticated endpoints

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can chain these vulnerabilities via a shared network to deliver and execute arbitrary code on a vCast-based device without user interaction. Potential device-level impact includes unauthorized access to displayed content, persistent installation and execution of arbitrary applications, and full compromise of the device. Additionally, an exploited device’s connected network may be prone to lateral movement.

Solution

Unfortunately, ViewSonic could not be reached to coordinate the vulnerability. In the meantime, firmware updates should be applied when available. If possible, segment vCast devices onto an isolated, secure network with strict controls, separate from systems containing sensitive data. Network activity should be monitored for suspicious vCast connections.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Adam Mohammed Zenker for this report. This document was written by Alexander Lewis.

Overview

Door access controllers used on Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) ships contain an improper authentication vulnerability that permits a replayed unique identifer (UID) from a radio-frequency identification (RFID) device to grant unauthorized entry to areas secured by these controllers.

Description

Norwegian Cruise Line is a global cruise company that operates a modern fleet sailing to destinations worldwide. As described in CVE-2026-75907, the affected card reader authenticates NFC credentials only by checking their static 7-byte UID. A UID is not a secret and does not support cryptographic challenge‑response operations, so it cannot serve as a reliable authentication factor. Although the keycard's NTAG212 tag contains a memory block with a printed serial number and a value resembling a signature, the reader does not inspect this data during the access-control process. Validation based solely on UID constitutes identification rather than authentication. Because the credential performs no cryptographic exchange and offers no defense against cloning, any device capable of replaying or emulating UIDs can reproduce a functioning keycard.

Impact

An attacker with brief physical proximity to a valid keycard can use an RFID reader to capture the UID without interacting with or altering the card. Once obtained, this UID can be copied to an inexpensive UID‑writable card to create a permanent duplicate credential. The access control readers will accept these forgeries as genuine, granting entry. Depending on logging configuration, the unauthorized entry may be indistinguishable from legitimate use. Because unauthorized access to restricted areas on a cruise vessel can have direct safety implications, this vulnerability presents a significant security risk to both internal operations and guest safety.

Solution

Unfortunately, we were unable to reach the vendor to coordinate this vulnerability. Users are encouraged to employ the following methods to help reduce the risk of RFID cloning:
* RFID‑blocking wallets and shielded card-holder sleeves prevent unauthorized scans.
* Placing aluminum foil on both sides of your RFID card can help limit signal transmission by creating a basic Faraday shield.
* When using or storing your card, try to keep a distance of at least 12 inches from other people or devices. Cards operating at 13.56 MHz are usually read at an approximate distance of 2–5 cm (1–2 inches).

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Mark Linton for reporting this vulnerability. This document was written by Bob Kemerer.

RemControl névre hallgat az új malware-as-a-service (MaaS) platform, ahol rosszindulatú hirdetési kampányokkal vesznek célba Anroidos rendszereket. A legalább május óta aktív infrastruktúra első mintáit még júliusban észlelték, akkor több mint 30 olyan adathalász felugró ablakot azonosítottak, amelyek célja a banki belépési adatok megszerzése volt. A Group-IB kiberbiztonsági cég szerint a kampányok során főleg európai (Olaszország, […]

A mesterséges intelligencia (MI) jelentős mértékben növelte az online manipuláció és egyéb csalási célzattal létrehozott hamis fiókok és profilok elterjedését a közösségi médiaplatformokon. A probléma kezelésére a LinkedIn szerdán jelentette be legújabb eszközkészletét, ami egyúttal jobb kezelhetőséget biztosít a felhasználók és a szervezetek számára. Az új funkcióval a felhasználók mostantól igazolhatják egymás szakmai tapasztalatait, a […]

Az ír Adatvédelmi Bizottság (Data Protection Commission, DPC) több mint 403 millió euróra, mintegy 462 millió dollárra bírságolta a Google-t a helyadatok kezelésével kapcsolatos adatvédelmi hiányosságok miatt. A hatóság emellett arra kötelezte a vállalatot, hogy hat hónapon belül módosítsa adatkezelési gyakorlatát. A hatóság 2020 februárjában indított vizsgálatot, miután több európai fogyasztóvédelmi szervezet kifogásolta a Google […]

Overview

Imprivata Enterprise Access Management (EAM), an authentication and single sign-on platform for enterprise and clinical environments, contains a vulnerability in versions 26.2.6 and below. The product provides no supported mechanism to rotate its RSA key pair after deployment, meaning the same key pair is used indefinitely to generate the appliance's X.509 certificate.

Description

CVE-2026-82356
Imprivata EAM uses an RSA key pair to generate the X.509 certificate that identifies the appliance to the clinical workstations, Electronic Health Record (EHR) platforms, and shared-device workflows that rely on it for authentication. After reviewing the product documentation and engaging Imprivata support, it was confirmed that no supported mechanism exists to rotate this RSA key pair after deployment.

Using a single RSA key pair indefinitely for certificate generation violates cryptographic best practices. Because the key cannot be rotated, an attacker who obtains the private key retains a valid, trusted appliance identity for as long as the deployment remains in service, with no supported means to revoke or replace it short of redeploying the product.

Impact

An attacker who obtains the private key, for example through backup exfiltration, a hypervisor snapshot, or privileged access to the appliance filesystem, can impersonate the appliance to any endpoint that trusts its certificate. Because Imprivata EAM sits directly in the authentication path, this allows persistent, difficult-to-detect interception of authentication traffic across every application the appliance brokers, including SSO tokens, session assertions, and credentials for EHR and clinical systems. If perfect forward secrecy is not enforced, previously captured traffic can also be decrypted retroactively. Because the key pair cannot be rotated, this access persists until the appliance is redeployed.

Solution

Unfortunately, Imprivata could not be reached to coordinate this case. The vendor is aware of the issue, which they are tracking internally, and is reported to be working toward a resolution. No fix or timeline has been provided at the time of publication.

Until a fix is available, affected users should protect the appliance's private key by restricting filesystem and administrative access, securing backups and hypervisor snapshots, and enforcing perfect forward secrecy on upstream connections to limit the impact of any key compromise.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Frank "5y5tem5" Mileto for reporting this issue. This document was written by Alexander Curtis.

Overview

Cinnamon's Kotaemon (all versions up to v0.12.0) multi‑user chat interface does not verify conversation ownership when loading a conversation. Any authenticated user can read, delete, rename, or overwrite another user’s conversation data by supplying the correct ID. This results in high‑impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability violations.

Description

Cinnamon's Kotaemon is an open‑source, retrieval‑augmented generation (RAG) based tool that lets you build a chatbot capable of "chatting with your documents". As discussed in CVE-2026-86867, all versions up to v0.12.0 fail to verify conversation ownership when loading a conversation. In multi‑user mode, each conversation row includes a user field that identifies its owner. The four affected handlers, select_conv, delete_conv, rename_conv, and persist_chat_suggestions, query conversations using select(Conversation).where(Conversation.id == conversation_id)

No predicate is included to ensure Conversation.user == user_id. As a result, any authenticated user can operate on conversations they do not own.

Impacted operations include:
* select_conv – reads the full chat transcript, RAG retrieval history (verbatim excerpts from uploaded private documents), plot history, and suggestion data belonging to another user.
* delete_conv – permanently deletes a conversation.
* rename_conv – renames a conversation.
* persist_chat_suggestions – overwrites a chat suggestion list.

Although select_conv includes an ownership check for the selected (file‑picker) field, all sensitive payloads (chat history, retrieval history, plot history) are returned unconditionally. The system trusts user‑controlled identifiers for authorization. Attackers require only an authenticated account on the instance and a victim conversation UUID (Universally Unique Identifier). Affected users’ public conversations appear in the global conversation browser, exposing their UUIDs. If a conversation is later set to private, the UUID remains unchanged and still valid. Similar direct calls to delete_conv, rename_conv, and persist_chat_suggestions allow deletion, renaming, or content overwriting. No elevated privileges are required; any authenticated user account is sufficient.

Impact

Full chat transcripts and RAG retrieval history for any conversation are disclosed. For Kotaemon's primary deployment use case (enterprise document Q&A over proprietary knowledge bases such as legal briefs, financial reports, research papers, and internal strategy documents), the retrieval_history field contains verbatim excerpts from those private documents. A single IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) read may expose more sensitive content than what the affected user intended to share with any other party.

Conversations can be renamed or have their suggestion state overwritten. While the impact of renaming is limited, the persist_chat_suggestions path allows an attacker to inject attacker-controlled prompt suggestions into the victim's conversation UI, a potential vector for prompt injection if the AI model acts on suggested prompts.

delete_conv permanently destroys any conversation with a single call. An attacker can systematically delete all conversations of a target user or across all users if they have access to the UUIDs. There is no recycle bin or soft-delete in the Kotaemon data model for conversations.

Because retrieval_history contains verbatim document chunks (not just file names), the attacker does not need separate file-read permissions to access the content of documents indexed into the victim's knowledge base. The chat conversation becomes a side-channel through which document content leaks.

Solution

Unfortunately, the vendor could not be reached to coordinate this vulnerability. While an official patch is not available at this time, please refer to the vendor's web site and GitHub repository (listed in the references below) for future updates.
https://github.com/Cinnamon/kotaemon
https://cinnamon.github.io/kotaemon/

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Louis Sanchez for reporting this vulnerability. This document was written by Bob Kemerer.

Kibertámadás érte a Müncheni Ludwig Maximilian Egyetemet (LMU), amelynek során egy ismeretlen támadó jogosulatlanul hozzáfért az egyetem egyik informatikai rendszerében tárolt beiratkozási adatokhoz. Az incidens vizsgálata folyamatban van. Az érintett adatok között szerepelhetnek a hallgatók nevei, születési dátumai, egyéb azonosító adatai, elérhetőségei, LMU-s e-mail-címei, bankszámla információi, valamint tanulmányaikra és korábbi végzettségeikre vonatkozó adatok. Az egészségbiztosítási […]

Újabb Microsoft Defender zero-day sebezhetőség kihasználó kódjait (exploit) tette közzé Abdelhamid Naceri (közismertebb nevén Nightmare Eclipse) biztonsági kutató a hétvégén. A mostani PoC eszköz a BigDiskBuster nevet kapta. Hasonlít a kutató által még áprilisban közzétett UnDefend elnevezésű Defender nulladik napi sebezhetőséghez, ami lehetővé tette az átlagos felhasználók számára, hogy blokkolják a definíciófrissítéseket. A BigDiskBuster minden […]